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LIBERALIZING ABORTION IN IRELAND: IN RE
ARTICLE 26 AND THE PASSAGE OF THE
REGULATION OF INFORMATION (SERVICES
OUTSIDE THE STATE FOR THE TERMINATION
OF PREGNANCIES) BILL
I. INTRODUCTION
The Irish Constitution recognizes the right to life of an unborn
child and provides that the laws of Ireland will protect and defend that
right.' In light of this, may Ireland prohibit women from obtaining
abortion information for the purpose of traveling abroad in order to
avail themselves of legal abortion services in other countries?2 This
I. IR. CONST. art. 40, § 3(3). Section 3(3) provides that "[tlhe State acknowledges the
right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guaran-
tees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that
right." Id.
2. The Censorship of Publications Act of 1929, § 16, "makes it unlawful to print, pub-
lish, sell or distribute any book or periodical which advocated abortion." Censorship of Publi-
cations Act, 1929, § 16, quoted in Ann Sherlock, The Right to Life of the Unborn and the Irish
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topic has been at issue in many cases, with the Irish courts continuous-
ly holding that any assistance provided for women seeking an abortion
violated the unborn child's constitutional right to life and was, there-
fore, illegal.' However, in its most recent and controversial decision
on the topic, In re Article 26 and the Regulation of Information (Servic-
es Outside the State for the Termination of Pregnancies) Bill,4 the Irish
Supreme Court ultimately held that the mother's right to information
can coexist with the unborn child's right to life. Therefore, if seeking a
lawful abortion, women cannot be prohibited from traveling abroad nor
be denied information regarding the location of legally operating abor-
tion clinics abroad.5
The debate over whether women may obtain information regarding
abortion services abroad began long before the current case was decid-
ed. By 1992, Irish law had recognized the principle that a mother's
rights are superior to those of an unborn child; and, because of this, in
a situation where a mother's life was substantially at risk, she could
obtain a legal abortion in another country.6 By resolving the conflict
that arises when both the unborn child's and the mother's lives are at
risk, the Irish Supreme Court unknowingly unleashed a stream of logic
culminating in the decision of In re Article 26. After a series of deci-
sions on the issue and upon advice from both the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR),7 the supreme court in In re Article 26 had no choice but to
abandon its traditional policies and permit women to obtain information
regarding abortion services in other countries. The court unanimously
held that the rights of individuals stemmed from the constitution.! In
recognizing its duty to adhere to positive law,9 the judges concluded
that the only way to logically follow the principles of the constitution,
the cases interpreting it, and the principles of the EEC ° and the
Constitution, 24 IR. JUR. 13, 34 (1989).
3. E.g., Attorney Gen. ex rel. Soc'y for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v.
Open Door Counseling Ltd., 1988 I.R. 619 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library,
CASES File.
4. No. 87 (Ir. S.C. May 12, 1995) (LEXIS, Irelnd library, CASES file) [hereinafter In re
Article 26].
5. Id. at *15.
6. Attorney Gen. v. X, [19921 1 I.R. 1, 1992 I.L.R.M. 401 (Ir. S.C.); see also McGee
v. Att'y Gen., 1974 I.R. 284 (Ir. S.C.).
7. See discussion infra part III.
8. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *18.
9. Id. at *21. The judges abandoned precedent by using positive law. Positive law meant
that the judges used the language of the constitution to decide this issue. In past cases, the
court referred to natural law which resulted in the judges looking toward public policy regard-
ing the right to life of the unborn child first in order to interpret the constitution. Id. at *22.
10. This is referring specifically to the desire in Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty to
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ECHR was to permit women to obtain information regarding abortion
services abroad."
This casenote focuses on the In re Article 26 decision and the
constitutionality of the passage of the Regulation of Information (Ser-
vices Outside the State for the Termination of Pregnancies) Bill (Infor-
mation Bill)12 legalizing the distribution of abortion information in
Ireland. Part II presents the history of abortion law in Ireland and the
circumstances that lead to the presentation of this issue by the President
of Ireland to the Irish Supreme Court. Part III explores the pertinent
cases that lead to the decision in In re Article 26, including the influ-
ence of the EEC and the ECHR and their implied endorsement of the
Information Bill. Part IV focuses on the decision in In re Article 26,
analyzing its reasoning and explaining the Irish Supreme Court's find-
ing that an unborn child's right to life can coexist with the mother's
right to abortion information.
II. IN RE ARTICLE 26 - FRAMING THE ISSUE
A. Legal History
Most Western European countries have moved from restrictive
abortion legislation toward liberalized policies. However, Ireland's
abortion legislation remained virtually unchanged, and perhaps had
even grown more restrictive, 3 until In re Article 26. Under the com-
mon law, abortion has always been illegal in Ireland. 4 This law has
been codified in many statutes, the first of which was enacted in
1803.'" The Offences Against the Person Act of 186116 is still in
remove any barriers to citizens wishing to avail themselves of services available in other mem-
ber states. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 59,
60, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 40-41 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
11. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *30.
12. Id. at *3-6 (summarizing the Regulation of Information Bill).
13. TOM HESKETH, THE SECOND PARTITIONING OF IRELAND I (1990).
14. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Grogan,
[1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, 854.
15. 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58 (1803) (Ir.) in 2 THE STATUTES cxxxv (3d ed. 1950) This statute
was one generally dealing with "malicious shooting or stabbing." Id.
16. Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, § 58 (Eng.) in 7 THE
STATUTES 266 (3d ed. 1950). Section 58 states:
Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own miscar-
riage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious
thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with
the like intent, and whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any
woman, whether she be or be not with child, shall unlawfully administer to
her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall
unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like in-
tent, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable ...
to be kept in penal servitude for life ....
1996]
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force today and was "reaffirmed by the Oireachtas in the Health (Fami-
ly Planning) Act [of] 1979."'" These laws culminated in 1983,8
when a referendum submitted to the citizens of Ireland resulted in a
constitutional amendment to article 40, section 3, and acknowledged
the right to life of the unborn. 9
The issue presented by In re Article 26 had previously lurked in
many cases, with the court consistently holding that no conflict in the
constitution would be resolved to the unborn child's detriment. In
1988, the Irish Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether
women would be permitted to obtain information and to travel to other
countries for the purpose of availing themselves of abortion services.20
The supreme court avoided making a decision specifically addressing a
woman's right to travel for the purpose of obtaining an abortion by
maintaining that this issue had not been directly raised in the case.2
However, the court did conclude that the distribution of information
regarding the location of abortion clinics threatened the life of the
unborn and was therefore unlawful.22
In 1992, the court considered whether a girl whose life was in
peril could travel to Great Britain in order to obtain an abortion.23 In
that case, although the court reversed the lower court's decision and
allowed a woman to obtain information in order to procure an abortion,
it emphasized that this decision did not permit women whose lives
were not in peril to receive abortion information.24 In neither case was
the court compelled to follow the principles of the EEC, which are
generally to guarantee the right to have access to services abroad."
However, the question was directly presented to the Irish High
Court in Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v.
Id.
17. Case 159/90, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 854. The Oireachtas is the Irish Legislature.
BRIAN DOOLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN IRELAND 29
(1984),
18. In 1983, a referendum went to the people of Ireland who, in return, voted to amend
the Irish Constitution to included the right to life of the unborn as a fundamental right. Pro-life
advocate groups wanted to extinguish any possible future legislation on abortion in Ireland.
HESKETH, supra note 13, at 2.
19. IR. CONST. art. 40, § 3(3). This amendment was enacted because it was feared that a
recent Irish Supreme Court decision recognizing the right to privacy in the marriage threatened
the anti-abortion statutes. J. M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 790 (3d ed. 1994).
20. Attorney Gen. ex rel. Soc'y for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Open
Door Counseling Ltd., 1988 I.R. 619 (Jr. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, CASES
File.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Attorney Gen. v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 1992 I.L.R.M. 401 (Ir. S.C.).
24. Id. at 403.
25. EEC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 2.
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Grogan26 (S.P.U.C.). In this instance, the court referred the case to
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling on wheth-
er abortions were "services" within the meaning of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty)." The
court found that abortion was a service within the meaning of the
treaty,2" however, the court would not require Ireland to refrain from
prohibiting women from obtaining assistance in locating abortion ser-
vices in other countries,29 holding that, in this case, the denial of in-
formation does not affect services in such a way as to frustrate the
goals of the EEC.3" Finally, in light of the ECJ's advisory opinion
and the constant resurrection of the issue of whether to provide infor-
mation on overseas abortion, the President of Ireland, Mary Robinson,
submitted it to the Irish Supreme Court for redeliberation.3 1
B. The Issue
When the issue of the legality of providing abortion information
was submitted to the Irish Supreme Court, the leading pro-life advo-
cates of Ireland were invited to participate in the discussion.32 The
question presented was whether the Information Bill pronounced pursu-
ant to article 26 of the Irish Constitution was repugnant to any other
provisions in the constitution. If found repugnant to the constitution, it
would become illegal to provide women with information regarding
abortion services abroad."
26. [1994] 1 I.R. 46, [19901 1 C.M.L.R. 689 (Ir. H. Ct. 1989).
27. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Grogan,
[1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849. "Services" are discussed within the EEC Treaty in articles 59 and 60.
EEC Treaty, supra note 10, arts. 59-60.
28. Case 159/90, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 893.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 893. The court, when examining a national law that conflicts with a Community
law, applies a proportionality test designed to balance the need for compliance with the EEC
Treaty and the importance of the national law to the member state. Grainne De Burca, The
Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law, 13 Y.B. EUR. LAW 106 (1994).
31. Chris Parkin, Abortion Information Bill is Legal, Irish Court Rules, PRESS ASS'N
NEWSFILE, May 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, PANEWS File. The President
submitted the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for the Termination of
Pregnancies) Bill in April, 1995, after the passage of the 14th Amendment to the Irish Consti-
tution. This amendment provided that the Eighth Amendment was to be regarded as separate
from the right to information. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *15.
32. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *15.
33. Id. at *7.
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11. THE PREVIOUS DECISIONS
A. The Open Door Decision
In a case in 1988, Attorney General ex rel the Society for the
Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counseling
Ltd., the defendants appealed an Irish High Court ruling that de-
clared unlawful non-directive counseling regarding abortion services
abroad and issued a restraining order preventing the defendants from
counseling women regarding abortion." The defendants contended
that the court could not deny women the right to receive information
for the purpose of seeking abortion services abroad, and that because
the supreme court was the highest court in Ireland, the issue must be
submitted for review by the ECJ to determine whether denying women
information regarding abortion clinics abroad conflicted with the free
movement of trade desired by the EEC.36 The defendants also con-
tended that the counseling services were neither directive nor judgmen-
tal, but only provided information regarding services requested by
women after their own consideration of their situation and options.37
The high court stated that although in some instances the right to
express opinions enumerated in the constitution may involve an auxilia-
ry right to information, this cannot override the constitutional rights of
the unborn child." Ultimately, the court declared the actions of the
defendants unlawful, stating that it would not consider the question of a
woman's constitutional right to information in a vacuum, free from
context.39 In the view of the court, the context clearly illustrated that
the information requested was directly related to the termination of
34. 1988 I.R. 619 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, CASES File. This case
was one of a series of cases presented to the Irish High Court and the Irish Supreme Court
after the 1983 referendum to the people that resulted in the Eighth Amendment to the Irish
Constitution. These cases were initiated by amendment supporters who wanted to terminate
abortion clinic referral services in Ireland. This issue was presented to the courts in a number
of cases which inevitably invoked European law when defendants in such cases appealed these
decisions to the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ. KELLY, supra note 19, at 792.
35. Open Door, 1988 I.R. 619, available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, CASES File, at *2.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *5. Defendants also emphasized that abortion clinics in Great Britain, to which
Open Door Counseling referred its clients, maintained a high standard of medical care. Id.
38. Id. at *9.
39. Id. The judge stated:
It seems to me an inescapable conclusion that if a woman was anxious to
obtain an abortion and if she was able by availing of the counseling services
of one or other of the defendants to obtain the precise location, address and
telephone number of and method of communication with, a clinic in Great
Britain which provided that service, put in plain language, that was knowing-
ly helping her to attain her objective.
Id. at *8.
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pregnancies, violating article 40, section 3, of the Irish Constitution.1°
Counseling women in a non-directive fashion, "knowing that they were
contemplating abortion, amounted to counseling or assisting pregnant
women to obtain an abortion."
4
'
Addressing the ECJ jurisdiction issue, the supreme court agreed
with the defendants that, as a member state of the EEC, the issue of
services sought by Irish residents outside their jurisdiction invoked
articles 5942 and 6W'3 of the EEC Treaty.4 However, the court did
not debate this issue because the pleadings, as written, failed to chal-
lenge the right of Irish citizens to avail themselves of services in other
member states of the EEC." The pleadings instead referred to the
legality of information provided inside the jurisdiction. 6 In its deci-
sion, the court stated that the link between abortion policies in Ireland
and the right to information was not strong enough to deny citizens of
Ireland the right to information. 7 Also, the court pointed out that
ultimately, the denial of information endangered women's health be-
cause many women were obtaining abortions in the later stages of
pregnancy due to the lack of counseling. 8 The court ultimately grant-
ed an injunction preventing the defendants from distributing abortion
information ."
Pro-life advocates viewed the 1988 Open Door decision as a victo-
ry. However, after the decision in Open Door, the defendants appealed
to the ECHR, claiming that the injunction violated article 10 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms," which protects the freedom of expression." The defendants'
40. Open Door, 1988 I.R. 619, available in LEXIS, Irclnd Library, CASES File, at *8.
41. Sherlock, supra note 2, at 32.
42. EEC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 59.
43. Id. art. 60.
44. Open Door, 1988 I.R. 619, available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, CASES File, at *10.
Article 59 states that "within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the
free supply of services within the Community shall be progressively abolished." EEC Treaty,
supra note 10, art. 59.
45. The EEC Treaty, article 177, has been interpreted to compel member states to refer
issues that involve an interpretation of a provision of the Treaty when such an issue is raised in
the highest court of the member state. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 340 (2d ed. 1995).
46. Open Door, 1988 I.R. 619, available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, CASES File, at *10.
Defendants never claimed that women were denied the right to travel and obtain an abortion.
In fact, women cannot be restrained from traveling to foreign countries to obtain abortion
services. Id. at *9.
47. Id. at *10.
48. Id.
49. Id. at *9.
50. Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
51. KELLY, supra note 19, at 806.
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appeal to the European Court of Human Rights ultimately pressured
Ireland to change its policies.
B. Case 159/90: The ECJ Ruling
1. Background
The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) was signed on March 25, 1957, and became effective on
January 1, 1958. sz The Community was originally comprised of three
separate entities,53 but in 1993 came under one institution known as
the European Union. 4 Ireland joined the EEC in 1973, and today
there are a total of fifteen member states .
The EEC, by design, works to promote free trade of services and
products between the European member states. Article 2 of the EEC
Treaty sets forth this principle:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
approximatizing the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities,
a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase of stability, an accelerated
raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States be-
longing to it.'
The purpose of the EEC is to establish a "Community legal system,
which is characterized by the transfer of sovereign powers ... from
the member states to the institutions of the community."57 The success
of the EEC is largely due to the allegiance of the member states to the
Community. However, this allegiance has resulted in a conflict be-
tween national sovereignty and conformity to the EEC.8 The ECJ
retains the power to resolve this conflict,59 often holding an individual
member state's national law subordinate to the law created through an
EEC agreement or treaty.'
52. EEC Treaty, supra note 10.
53. These separate entities were the European Coal and Steel Community, the European
Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic Community. CARTER & TRIMBLE,
supra note 45, at 549.
54. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (entered into
force Nov. 1, 1993).
55. As of January 1995, the fifteen member states were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: SELECTED DoCUMENTS 209 (1995).
56. EEC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 2
57. Mark L. Jones, Regional Economic Organizations: Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), 2 BASIC DOCUMENTS INT'L ECON. L. 3, 11 (1994).
58. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 45, at 343.
59. Id.
60. Id. Although it is not expressly stated in the EEC Treaty, it is well established that
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2. S.P.U.C. II
In recognition of the importance of the EEC, the Irish High Court
referred the issues raised in S.P. U. C.6 1 to the ECJ for a preliminary
ruling on whether the Irish law and Community law could coexist.62
The issues presented by the high court to the ECJ were: (1) whether
abortions were "services" within the meaning of the EEC treaty; (2) if
so, whether a member state could prohibit the distribution of informa-
tion regarding those services; and (3) if not, whether under Community
law, there was an exception.63  Before the ECJ ruling (S.P.U.C. 11)
was returned and the high court could make a final judgement on the
merits, the Irish Supreme Court affirmed an interlocutory injunction re-
straining the defendants from providing women with information re-
garding abortion clinics abroad.' 4
3. Abortion as "Services"
Article 3 of the EEC Treaty states that one of the principles of the
Community is to abolish any restriction on the movement of services
between the member states.65 The first question presented was wheth-
er abortions are considered "services" within the meaning of the treaty,
which would subject them to the provisions of the treaty.' The plain-
tiffs contended that abortion procedures were not services within the
meaning of the EEC Treaty because abortion was unlawful in Ireland,
arguing that it was both grossly immoral and repugnant to Ireland's
Community law preempts national law, just as U.S. federal law preempts state law. Id.
61. [1994] 1 I.R. 46, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 689 (Ir. H. Ct. 1989).
62. EEC Treaty art. 177 states:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary decision con-
cerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Communi-
ty; and
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act of the
Council, where such statutes so provide.
EEC Treaty, supra note 10, at art. 177.
63. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Grogan,
[1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, 888-89.
64. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Grogan, 1989 I.R. 760,
[1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 689, 700 (Ir. S.C.).
65. EEC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 3. "Freedom to provide services is one of the foun-
dations of the Community. As appears from Article 3 (c) of the Treaty, this freedom is one of
the constituents of the common market and consequently is indispensable to the achievement of
the objectives of the Community listed in Article 2 of the Treaty." Jean-Yves Art, Legislative
Lacunae, the Court of Justice and Freedom to Provide Services, in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDI-
CATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LAW 121 (Deirdre Curtain & David
O'Keefe eds., 1992).
66. Case 159/90, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 888.
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constitution.67
However, in its decision, the ECJ made it clear that all medical
procedures, including abortions, are services within the meaning of the
EEC Treaty.' The EEC Treaty recognizes as services any service
which is normally provided for remuneration, and article 60, section
(d), of the EEC Treaty specifically names as services "activities of the
liberal professions. ' 69 The court reasoned that although abortion ser-
vices were illegal in a few member states, the issue in this case was
not the extent to which Ireland has found abortion illegal, but rather,
that the member state providing the service recognizes abortion as a
legal service for which the physician receives compensation.7 °
The ECJ also supported its decision by pointing out that it had
reached the same conclusion in previous cases. 7 When defining ser-
vices within the meaning of the treaty, the court traditionally takes a
broad stance. The goal of the EEC is to integrate the markets of all
member states to such an extent that the economy is virtually that of
one great internal market. 2 Recognizing this goal, the court rarely
excludes a service legally provided for in several member states from
the provisions of the EEC Treaty, resulting in a tendency to be over-
inclusive instead of under-inclusive.73
4. May Ireland Prevent its Citizens from Using Services Provided
by other Countries Within the Communities?
Having established that abortions are a service subject to the provi-
sions of the EEC Treaty, the court in S. P. U. C. II next questioned the
prohibition of abortion services and the distribution of information
regarding the location of abortion clinics to determine if they fell with-
in the scope of articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty. In answering this
question, the court also addressed the third issue by concluding that a
country that prohibits abortion may deny its citizens information re-
garding legally established abortion clinics in other Community coun-
tries.
67. Id. at 890.
68. Id. at 890-91.
69. EEC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 60, § d.
70. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Grogan,
[1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, 890-91.
71. Id. at 890 (citing Case 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi v. Ministero del Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R.
377, [19851 3 C.M.L.R. 52 (1984)).
72. Art, supra note 65, at 123 (citing Case 15/81, Schul v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en
Accijnzen, 1982 E.C.R. 1409, 1431-32).
73. The court concluded with this statement: "Consequently, the answer to the national
court's first question must be that medical termination of pregnancy, performed in accordance
with the law of the State in which it is carried out, constitutes a service within the meaning of
Article 60 EEC." Case 159/90, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 890.
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In Cowan v. Tresor Public,4 the ECJ established that providers
of services have the right under the EEC Treaty to offer those services;
and accordingly, citizens of member states have the right to receive
those services.75 However, the court in S.P. U. C. II held that the link
between the distribution of information in Ireland and the abortion
procedures occurring in other countries "is too tenuous for the prohibi-
tion on the distribution of information to be capable of being regarded
as a restriction within the meaning of Article 59."76 Prohibiting the
distribution of abortion service information does not curtail the free
movement of services in such a way to hinder the stated goals of the
EEC Treaty.77 Therefore, article 62, which prohibits countries from
introducing restrictions on the movement of services, does not apply
since it only pertains to restrictions which fall within the scope of arti-
cle 59.7"
The court in S. P. U. C. H noted that the denial of information could
potentially affect the freedom to provide services." In deciding wheth-
er the services would be impaired enough to invoke the Treaty, the
court examined the nature of the service. This case deals with two
important rules, both stemming from fundamental rights: first, the right
under Community law to provide services; and second, the right to life
of the unborn child which is protected under the Irish Constitution.
Choices regarding public policy and morality are permitted under Com-
munity law and may serve as a basis to dismiss provisions infringing
on the member states' concepts of morality." The framers of the EEC
Treaty anticipated such claims and included them in articles 36, 56,
and 66 by making references to concepts of morality and public poli-
cy."' The court concluded that this issue sufficiently falls outside the
scope of Community law, entitling Ireland to interpret its own law to
see if it comports with fundamental rights such as the freedom of
speech.82
74. Case 186/87, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 613 (1989) (Fr.).
75. Id. at 631.
76. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Grogan,
[1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, 891.
77. Id. at 891-92.
78. Id. at 892.
79. Id. at 891 (citing Case 362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Confederation du Commerce
Luxembourgeois, [1990] 1 E.C.R. 667, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801).
80. Art, supra note 65, at 124.
81. EEC Treaty, supra note 10, arts. 36, 56, 66.
82. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Grogan,
[19911 3 C.M.L.R. 849, 892.
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5. Protocol No. 17
Before the signing of the Treaty on European Union in February
1992, Ireland wanted to be guaranteed that the decision in S. P. U. C. II
would insulate itself from any pro-abortion law stemming from any
provisions of the new treaty. 3 Ireland persuaded the European Union
to adopt Protocol No. 17 which states, "Nothing in the Treaty on the
European Union or in the Treaties establishing the European Commu-
nities or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those
Treaties shall affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the
Constitution of Ireland." '84 This provision was designed to prevent
Community law from affecting Ireland's abortion policy after the new
treaty went into effect on November 1, 19935 However, the effect of
this provision was unclear.
The question remained as to what extent Ireland was to be insulat-
ed from European law. The new provision could be interpreted as
forbidding women from both obtaining information regarding abortion
services and traveling abroad for the purpose of obtaining an abor-
tion.86 The provision could also be more narrowly interpretted to pro-
tect anti-abortion law by forbidding the distribution of abortion infor-
mation in Ireland without having any effect on the right to travel,
which is guaranteed under EC law. 7 The effect of the ECHR decision
in Open Door suggests that the European Union favored the narrower
version,88 and in light of the confusion raised by the decision in Attor-
ney General v. X,89 the Irish government felt compelled to enact some
83. KELLY, supra note 19, at 795.
84. Protocol 17, as quoted in KELLY, supra note 19, at 795.
85. KELLY, supra note 19, at 796.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The Irish government wanted to amend Protocol 17 to clarify the terms and affirm
Irish citizens right to travel, however the other European Union members would not allow this
fearing an amendment would lead to other amendments to the treaty. Ireland settled for the
issuance of the Solemn Declaration which provides,
The High Contracting Parties to the Treaty on European Union signed at
Maastricht on the 7th day of February 1992
Having considered the terms of Protocol No. 17 to the said Treaty on
European Union which is annexed to that Treaty and to the Treaties establish-
ing the European Communities
Hereby give the following legal interpretation:
that it was and is their intention that the Protocol shall not limit freedom either
to travel between member States or, in accordance with conditions which may
be laid down in conformity with Community law, by Irish legislation, to obtain
or make available in Ireland information relating to services lawfully available
in member States ....
Solemn Declaration, as quoted in KELLY, supra note 19, at 804.
89. [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 1992 I.L.R.M. 401 (Jr. S.C.).
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protective measures reaffirming Irish citizens' fundamental rights to
expression and travel.
C. Attorney General v. X
The monumentous holding of Attorney General v. X cannot be
underestimated because its reasoning lead to the resolution of many
unanswered questions regarding the right to information and the right
to travel. It also foreshadowed the holding of In re Article 26.9 In
Attorney General v. X, a young schoolgirl, who had allegedly been
raped, desired an abortion to be performed outside the jurisdiction
because the birth of the child posed a threat to the girl's life.9 The
Irish Supreme Court prioritized the conflicting rights to life of the
mother and the unborn child she carried by favoring the mother.92
1. The Lower Court
In the case's earlier phase, the Irish High Court, comporting with
the reasoning of Open Door, granted a permanent injunction restraining
the girl from leaving the country.93 The court reasoned that although
the Oireachtas failed to legislate on the issue of conflicting rights, it
was clear from the language of article 40, section 3 of the constitution
that any means of destroying the life of an unborn child was repugnant
to the laws and policy of Ireland.94 Furthermore, it was not definitive-
ly certain that the mother would lose her life as a result of the deliv-
ery; yet, it was certain an abortion would destroy the fetus." The
court also referred to the EEC advisory opinion and maintained that the
court was not obligated to permit women to travel to other countries
for the purpose of obtaining an abortion under articles 59 and 60 of the
EEC Treaty because anti-abortion sentiment was deeply embedded in
Ireland's history and laws.
96
90. The court in In re Article 26 relied heavily on this case because it directly dealt with
the question of information provided within Ireland for the purpose of obtaining an abortion,
and for the first time, the court held that such information would be permitted. Ironically, this
case (considered the most controversial case in Irish history before Article 26) was submitted
to the Irish court ten days after the signing of the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht.
KELLY, supra note 19, at 796.
91. Attorney Gen. v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 1992 I.L.R.M. 401, 401 (Jr. S.C.). The girl
threatened that she would commit suicide if she were forced to continue the pregnancy. KEL-
LY, supra note 19, at 797.
92. Attorney Gen., 1992 I.L.R.M. at 421.
93. Id. at 401.
94. Id. at 420.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 402.
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2. The Mother's Life Shall Prevail
Surprisingly, the Irish Supreme Court reversed the high court's
decision and discharged the injunctions.97 The court's methodology
differed from the lower court's because it did not offer the preferred
result and then find a way to reach that result. Rather, it adopted a
positivist position and examined the language of the constitution to
arrive at its conclusion.98 Article 40, section 3(3) of the Irish Consti-
tution states, "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn
and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees
in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend
and vindicate that right. ' This language, the court asserts, may only
be interpreted to mean that individuals (citizens) are afforded a funda-
mental right to life, and the "courts were the custodians of these
rights. "10
In true vindication of these rights, and settling the conflicts be-
tween them, the court must consider the life of the mother, her role in
the family, the dependence of persons on her, and her interaction with
people in the world.'' In light of these considerations, it would "in-
sufficiently vindicate the mother's right to life" to require that the birth
pose an immediate and definite risk to her.' °2 The supreme court
adopted a less stringent test than the high court, requiring that there
must be a "probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the
[mother's] life."' 3 The court found that the risk of suicide was suffi-
cient to establish a threat to the mother's life.10"
3. The Right to Travel and the EEC
The supreme court found it necessary to then prioritize rights, not
only between the lives of the mother and the unborn child, but also
between other rights expressly and implicitly stated in the constitution,
specifically the right to travel versus the right to life. 05 In the consti-
97. Attorney Gen., 1992 I.L.R.M. at 461. The Irish Supreme Court wanted to submit the
case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. However, this would have delayed the case for eigh-
teen months or so which the court was not willing to do. KELLY, supra note 19, at 799.
98. Attorney Gen., 1992 I.L.R.M. at 424-25. The court explains that it is the judge's role
to interpret the constitution in accordance with the prevailing concepts of prudence, justice, and
charity. The judge should not interpret the constitution in accordance with the ideas behind the
constitution at the time it was drafted because the constitution must adapt to changes in senti-
ment among the people of Ireland. Id.
99. IR. CONST. art. 40, § 3(3).
100. Attorney Gen., 1992 I.L.R.M. at 423.
101. Id. at 425.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 427.
104. Id.
105. Attorney Gen., 1992 I.L.R.M. at 427.
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tution, there is an implied right to travel stemming from the expressed
right to liberty. The supreme court recognized that with liberty comes
the freedom to be free from encumbrances, and from this right stems a
right to travel."° However, the court found that in a free society,
where rights may conflict, it is sometimes necessary to establish a
hierarchy of rights."0 7
The freedom to travel is guaranteed in the constitution and so is
the right to life. When the two concepts are "in stark conflict"'0 8 with
each other, it is clear that the right to life takes precedence over the
right to travel."°9 In saying this, a mother cannot vindicate her right
to travel over an unborn child's right to life."' Even though this ide-
ology conflicts with the stated goals of the EEC, in light of the mag-
nitude of the public policy considerations, the court explained that this
issue should not be resolved in any other way."'
The supreme court decision in Attorney General v. X left many
questions unanswered, particularly the level of protection awarded to
the fundamental rights of freedom to travel and freedom of expression.
In light of the Open Door decision, and the right to have access to
services protected under EC law, the Irish courts were slowly being
forced to clearly reconcile these rights with the right to life of the
unborn. As part of the campaign to support the European Union, the
Irish government added amendments to the constitution that were de-
signed to protect the right of freedom to travel and the right to infor-
mation.
One such amendment was added to article 40, section 3(3), '12
which also protects the right to life of the unborn. After the passage of
this amendment, courts were still able to issue injunctions preventing
women from obtaining abortions in other countries because although
the newly guaranteed rights were designed to reaffirm fundamental
personal liberties of Irish citizens, they were not designed to diminish
the right to life of the unborn." 3 In the case of In re Article 26, the
supreme court looked at the language of the constitution to find that by
implementing the legislation protecting women's fundamental freedoms
106. Attorney Gen., 1992 I.L.R.M. at 428.
107. Id. at 429.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Attorney Gen., 1992 I.L.R.M. at 433.
112. IR. CONST. art. 40, § 3(3). Sub-section 3 provides, "This subsection shall not limit
freedom to travel between the State and another state. This subsection shall not limit freedom
to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by
law, information relating to services lawfully available in another state." Id.
113. KELLY, supra note 19, at 807.
19961
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
was to bridge the gap so that the rights of the mother and the rights of
the unborn child could finally coexist, but at the expense of Ireland's
anti-abortion tradition.
IV. CASE ANALYSIS
A. The Facts
The President of Ireland submitted the Information Bill"' to the
Irish Supreme Court on March 18, 1995."1 The Information Bill
"amend[ed] the Indecent Advertisements Act [of] 1889 and the Censor-
ship of Publications Acts of 1929 to 1967 '16 to allow information
regarding the termination of pregnancies legally performed outside the
state to be provided to women and the general public." 7 The Infor-
mation Bill was referred to the supreme court pursuant to article 26 of
the Irish Constitution" 8 which provides that the President may refer
any bill to the supreme court for a determination of whether a bill is
repugnant to any other provision of the constitution." 9 The power to
obtain advice from the supreme court, or from the people through a
referendum, is unique to this jurisdiction. 2 ' However, once a bill has
been submitted to the supreme court, article 26 forbids the President
from signing it if the court concludes that constitutional provisions are
jeopardized by the introduction of the bill in question.' 2 '
Considering the nature and controversy surrounding the Informa-
tion Bill, the strong opposition to it, and the magnitude of the decision,
the President took an unusual approach in staging the supreme court
argument by appointing two groups, each advocating opposite positions
in reference to the bill.'22 One group argued on behalf of the child's
114. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *3-6 (summarizing the Regulation of Information
Bill).
115. Id. at *2.
116. Id. (quoting the Regulation of Information Bill).
117. Id.
118. IR. CONST. art. 26. Article 26 procedure has been used only eight times since the 1937
Irish Constitution. KELLY, supra note 19, at 214.
119. IR. CONST. art. 26, § 1(l), Section 1(1) provides:
The President may, after consultation with the Council of State, refer any Bill to
which this Article applies to the Supreme Court for a decision on the question as
to whether such Bill or any specified provision or provisions of such Bill is or are
repugnant to this Constitution or any provision thereof.
Id.
120. DOOLAN, supra note 17, at 29.
121. IR. CONST. art. 26, § 3. Sub-section 1 of section 3 provides, "In every case in which
the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Su-
preme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the
President shall decline to sign such Bill." Id.
122. In reArticle 26, supra note 4, at *2.
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right to life, and the other group argued on behalf of the mother's right
to life.'23 Neither team was "limited in the making of any arguments
against the constitutionality of the Bill or any provision thereof.", 24
The oral hearing on the matter began on April 4, 1995.25 On May
12, 1995, the supreme court handed down its eighty page opinion,
holding unanimously that the Information Bill was not repugnant to any
provision in the constitution.'26
B. Constitutional Interpretation and the Presumption of
Constitutionality
The court began its analysis of the constitutionality of the Informa-
tion Bill by making two preliminary and crucial decisions. First, in de-
termining whether the bill is repugnant to the provisions enumerated in
the Irish Constitution, the court stated that they would evaluate the
content of the Information Bill under a presumption of constitutional-
ity.'27 Former decisions have required that where the President refers
a bill pursuant to article 26 of the constitution to the supreme court, the
court must apply the presumption of constitutionality. 28 The principle
is based on the fact that the bill had already been passed by both hous-
es of the Oireachtas, and was therefore entitled to that presump-
tion. 29 This standard requires that where two interpretations of the
constitutionality of the bill are possible, the interpretation finding that
the bill and constitution are compatible must be adopted.' 3
The second decision made by the court, which had a direct impact
on its final decision, was that when interpreting the constitution, the
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *3.
126. Id. at *30; see also Parkin, supra note 31.
127. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *7.
128. Id. Article 34, subsection 3 of the constitution provides that a Bill which is introduced
under article 26 and passes the test of constitutionality is entitled to permanent immunity, and
even upon a change of condition, it cannot be challenged. IR. CONST. art. 34, § 3; see also
KELLY, supra note 19, at 218.
129. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *7.
130. Id. The court provides:
(1) That it must be presumed that all proceedings, procedures,
discretions and adjudications permitted or prescribed by the Bill are intended
[to] be conducted in accordance with the principles of constitutional justice,
and
(2) that as between two or more reasonable constructions of the terms
of the Bill the construction that is in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution would prevail over any construction that is not in accordance
with such provisions.
Id. (quoting from East Donegal Co-operative Livestock Marts v. Attorney Gen., 1970 I.R. 317
Qr. S.C.)).
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court would adhere to the principle of positive law.' 3' In most of its
past decisions considering abortion law, the supreme court began its
decision with the outcome in mind derived from principles of natural
law.' 32 The court carried anti-abortion policies throughout its analysis
and interpreted the constitution so as to validate the decision already
made pursuant to natural law. In Open Door, the court asserted that
"the natural law is the fundamental law of the state and as such is
antecedent and superior to all positive law, including the Constitu-
tion."' 33 The supreme court in In re Article 26 rejected this argument
by re-examining its role prescribed by the constitution, and ultimately
departed from traditional "natural law" adhered to in previous abortion
cases. 134
Upon examination of the text of the constitution, the supreme court
held that the constitution is the supreme law of the state.' 35 Article 5
of the constitution states that "Ireland is a sovereign, independent,
democratic state."' 36 Article 6 provides that as a sovereign and demo-
cratic state, the government derives its powers, "under God, from the
people;"' 137 therefore, the government is in the hands of the people,
and the constitution defines and limits the powers assigned to the gov-
ernment. "I Article 15, section 1, sub-section 1 of the constitution
enumerates this principle by stating that "[tihe Oireachtas shall not
enact any law which is in any respect repugnant to the Constitution or
any provision thereof."' 39 Article 28 provides that the President must
also refer to the constitution as well.' 40 Finally, article 35, section 2
states that "[aill judges shall be independent in the exercise of their
judicial functions and subject only to this Constitution and the
law.""' In sum, all three branches of the government derive their
131. Id. at *17.
132. Id. at *18.
133. Id. at *17. The quote continues:
that it is impermissible for the People to exercise the power of amendment of
the Constitution by way of variation, addition or repeal, as permitted by
Article 46 of the Constitution unless such amendment is compatible with the
natural law and existing provisions of the Constitution and if they purport to
do so, such amendment had no effect.
Id.
134. In reArticle 26, supra note 4, at *18.
135. Id.
136. IR. CONST. art. 5.
137. Id. art. 6.
138. Id.
139. Id. art. 15, § I.
140. Id. art. 28, § 2. Section 2 provides, "The executive power of the State shall, subject to
the provisions of this Constitution be exercised by or on the authority of the government." Id.
141. Id. art. 35, § 2.
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power solely from the constitution and are subservient to it.
The judges also dedicated a substantial portion of their decision in
In re Article 26 to analyzing their role as interpreters of the constitu-
tion and declared that they may not choose among various beliefs.'42
Rather, they must turn to the constitution, which outlines their du-
ties.4 3 The court concluded that when determining the fundamental
rights granted to citizens by the constitution, judges are required to
read the language in light of the principles of prudence, justice, and
charity.' Moreover, the court recognized that "from time to time
the prevailing ideas of these virtues may be conditioned by the passage
of time: no interpretation of the Constitution is intended to be final for
all time."' 45 In other words, it is clear that "rights given by the Con-
stitution must be considered in accordance with concepts of prudence,
justice, and charity, which may gradually change or develop as society
changes and develops and which fail to be interpreted from time to
time in accordance with prevailing ideas." '146
The court envisioned a constitution which can adapt to changing
ideas and social policies; and having established this, it began its inter-
pretation of the constitution and the Information Bill free from the
weight of past decisions regarding abortions. This set the stage for the
radical departure the supreme court took from traditional abortion law.
C. Article 14
The passage of the Information Bill would not be possible without
the enactment of article 141'7 of the constitution. 4 This article
bridges the gap between the Information Bill, which allows distribution
of information pertaining to abortion services abroad, and article 40,
which protects the fundamental right to life of the unborn.'49 Article
14 states, "this sub-section [referring to article 40, section 3, sub-sec-
tion 3] shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State,
subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information
relating to services lawfully available in another state."'"5 This provi-
sion enables the Information Bill to co-exist with the right to life of the
unborn because the information regarding abortion services sought by
142. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *20.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *21.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. IR. CONST. art. 14.
148. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *7.
149. IR. CONST. art. 40. The amendment was intended to overrule the decisions in Open
Door and S.P. U. C. KELLY, supra note 19, at 790.
150. IR. CONST. art. 14.
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pregnant women only pertains to legal services outside the state and
does not encourage illegal abortions within Ireland. 5'
The supreme court in In re Article 26 acknowledged that before
the enactment of article 14, information regarding the termination of
pregnancies was illegal because it presented a direct conflict with the
eighth amendment to the constitution providing that unborn children
have a fundamental right to life that the state vows to protect and
defend. 52 The court in Open Door'53 considered the right to infor-
mation and its effect on the right to life of unborn children and held
that allowing assistance to women to obtain abortion was in direct
conflict with the eighth amendment and was therefore unlawful."s4
This judgment was affirmed by the Irish Supreme Court in the
S.P.U.C. case.'55 Although the issue was framed for the purpose of
invoking the EEC Treaty, the In re Article 26 court held that the judg-
ment in "the Open Door Counseling case is not open to any other
interpretation. "156
This issue was further considered in Attorney General v. X,
but this decision threw a wrench in the supreme court's reasoning in
previous cases making the outcome of In re Article 26 inevitable. The
court in In re Article 26 held that
having regard to the true interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, termina-
tion of the life of the unborn is permissible if it is established as a matter of
probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from
the health of the mother and that that risk can only be avoided by the termi-
nation of her pregnancy.'58
The court further interpreted this to mean that "once the termination of
the pregnancy is permissible the mother has the right to all relevant
information necessary to enable her to have the pregnancy terminat-
ed."' 59 This interpretation of the constitution is embodied in article 14
which, as the court notes, clearly states that information relating to a
151. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *15. The court states, "The purpose of this Amend-
ment was to remove the inhibition placed on the granting of information with regard to these
services relating to the termination of pregnancies, by the decisions of the Supreme Court
based on the provisions of Article 40, section 3, sub-section 3 of the Constitution." Id.
152. Id. at *9.
153. Attorney Gen. ex rel. Soc'y for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Open
Door Counseling Ltd., 1988 I.R. 619 (Ir. S.C.), available in LEXIS, Irelnd Library, CASES
File.
154. Id. at *9.
155. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.) Ltd. v. Grogan, [1994] 1 I.R. 46,
[1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 689 (Ir. H. Ct. 1989).
156. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *12.
157. [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 1992 I.L.R.M. 401 (Ir. S.C.).
158. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *13.
159. Id. at *14.
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lawful service must be available to those desiring it."6
D. The Rights to Life of the Mother and the Unborn Child
The court in In re Article 26 emphasized that neither the Informa-
tion Bill nor article 14 affect the constitution other than in relation to
the right to information.' 6 The provisions contained in the bill are
designed neither to promote nor to encourage abortions in Ireland." 2
The Information Bill includes a substantial number of provisions which
directly relate to the manner in which abortion information will be pro-
vided so as not to sanction abortion practices. For example, section
8(1) provides that no person giving information shall arrange or sched-
ule the abortion abroad.' 63 Section 7(1) provides that it is unlawful
for persons to receive financial compensation or any other benefit for
providing information regarding abortion services abroad." These
safeguards are essential in determining the constitutionality of the
Information Bill because their absence would endanger the delicate
balance between the bill and the eighth amendment to the constitu-
tion. ,65
Another element of the Information Bill worth noting is that the
only person entitled to receive such information is a woman." Coun-
sel for the opponents to the Information Bill pointed out that under this
definition, husbands would not be notified that their wives were seek-
ing such information.'67 They also pointed out that the definition does
not exclude minors.' 8 The court acknowledged this interpretation and
applied the presumption of constitutionality which requires that if a
provision of the Information Bill can be interpreted two ways, the
160. Id. at *15. This also comports with the provisions of the EEC Treaty.
161. Id. at *24.
162. Id.
163. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *5 (quoting the Regulation of Information Bill, §
8(1)). This section states:
It shall not be lawful for a person to whom Section 5 applies of the employer
or principal of the person to make an appointment or any other arrangement
for or on behalf of a woman with a person who provides services outside the
State for the termination of pregnancies.
Id.
164. Id. at *5 (citing the Regulation of Information Bill, § 7(1)). This section provides that
it is unlawful "[tlo obtain directly or indirectly any financial or benefit or advantage from any
person who provides services outside the State or who has an interest in a body providing such
services." Id.
165. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *27.
166. Id. at *28.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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interpretation of constitutionality must be adopted. 69 The court found
that this provision does comport with the provisions of the constitution
because the information is allowed for those who will use it. 70 Any
adjustment to the provision that would allow for husbands to be noti-
fied would upset the balance of rights by infringing on the rights of the
mother.'
7
'
The Information Bill manages to resolve the difficult issue of
conflicting rights of the unborn child and the mother by protecting the
fundamental right to life of the unborn within Ireland while protecting
a woman's right to information and to travel outside Ireland for the
purpose of obtaining a lawful abortion abroad. Therefore, the supreme
court ruled that the Information Bill was not repugnant to any provi-
sions contained in the Irish Constitution.'72
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in In re Article 26 represents a divergence from
tradition in two respects. First, the opinion itself overturned centuries
of anti-abortion policies in Ireland by allowing women access to infor-
mation provided for the sole purpose of obtaining abortions. Although
this decision only liberalizes abortion indirectly, the Catholic Church
has expressly opposed the passage of the Information Bill, fearing its
enactment has set off the first domino in legal and constitutional rea-
soning which will end with legally permitted abortions in Ireland.
Second, the method by which the court arrived at its conclusion has
great legal significance in that it clarifies the principles of Irish law and
the method by which the Irish Constitution will be interpreted. The
court held that the constitution is the supreme law of the land and all
government entities are subordinate to it. This break from the tradi-
tional natural law approach directly affected the outcome of In re Arti-
cle 26. It is surprising, in light of the complexity and controversy
surrounding this case, that the court's decision was unanimous. How-
ever, the clarity and simplicity in the logic of the opinion reveals that,
at this point in history, Ireland is prepared to concede to some princi-
ples of the world outside its Catholic tradition.
The court apparently weighed heaviest the opinion of the ECJ and
the holding of Attorney General v. X when considering the constitution-
ality of the Information Bill. Although the ECJ refrained from requir-
ing Ireland to allow abortion information about services abroad, its
determination that Irish law could potentially conflict with the princi-
169. Id.
170. In re Article 26, supra note 4, at *29.
171. See id.
172. Id. at *30.
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ples of the EEC and the opinion of the ECHR clearly affected the
court's willingness to conform to intra-community policies, and to
acquiesce to the growing uniformity among the European states. Attor-
ney General v. X best represents the tension between the conflicting
rights of the unborn child and the mother, and the rights to information
and travel. This case provided a bridge by which the supreme court in
In re Article 26 could combat the previous decisions while appearing to
simply expand on reasoning already founded in Attorney General v. X.
Although the In re Article 26 was a radical departure, it was masked
by the rationality, timeliness, and ultimate constitutionality of the Infor-
mation Bill.
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